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ABSTRACT 
After a brief description of the proposals for rail privatisation in Great Britain, this 
paper contrasts these with the proposals and experience in other countries around the 
world. 
The proposals and experience in other countries contain some elements of the British 
proposals, however, the 'open access' element that features strongly in the British 
proposals has never been experienced on any significant scale elsewhere. 
In conclusion, experience elsewhere may shed light on the likely outcome of some 
aspects of the British proposals, but other aspects such as 'open access' and vertical 
separation are still unknowns. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In July 1992, the British Government published a White Paper, 'New Opportunities 
for the Railways'. This outlined the government's proposals for the privatisation of 
and introduction of competition into British Rail (BR). Over a year later and after 
considerable discussion the Railways Act (1993) has been enacted and took effect from 
the 1st April, 1994. 
The Railways Act (1993) can be viewed as the culmination of government policy, 
which during the past 10-15 years has sought to reduce its subsidy payments to BR 
through improvements in productive efficiency and placing emphasis on 
commercialisation within the BR organisation. 
This policy resulted in a total reorganisation of BR from a regional basis t o  a sector 
basis. From 1962 to 1982 BR was organised on a regional basis, with each region 
responsible for a variety of services. Some services that exhibited economies of scale, 
such as procurement and finance, were centralised. This organisational structure 
made allocating responsibility for revenue, subsidy and costs a very imprecise process. 
There was also a separation of the commercial and the operating roles of 
management, right up to the Chief Executive level. 
In an aim to improve the accountability of services, and managers, BR was 
reorganised into five sectors, Intercity, Regional Railways, Network Southeast, Freight 
and Parcels (see Castles, 1993). Staff and assets were made sector specific, although 
operations were still carried out by the operating department. The two main 
advantages of this organisation (see Nash & Preston, 1993) were (i) i t  made possible 
the definition of much clearer lines of managerial control and (ii) every manager had 
much tighter control over assets and so increased accountability for both his own and 
his sector's performance. 
This policy, coupled with government cuts in subsidy throughout the eighties, has 
resulted in an impressive improvement in both BR's productive and commercial 
performance, as illustrated by Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: BR Performance 1979-1991192 (1991/92 prices) 
Source: British Railways Board, AMual Reports and Accounts 
199U92 
1,035 
8,880 
19,920 
10.51 
2,473 
231.3 
1,996 
1989190 
705 
8,897 
20,908 
10.81 
2,483 
225 
2,043 
Total Grant (Em) 
Pass. Route Miles 
Pass. Miles (millions) 
Fare per passenger 
mile 
Passenger Stations 
Passenger Train Miles 
(millions) 
Train Miles per Member 
of Staff 
1979 
1,237 
8,955 
19,000 
9.14 
2,365 
196 
1,521 
1983 
1,430 
8,932 
18,350 
9.69 
2,363 
203 
1,686 
Without wishing to dwell on Table 1.1, it can be seen that BR has succeeded in 
significantly reducing its total grantlsubsidy throughout the eighties with only a 
slight reduction in the passenger network. The main reason for BR's improvement 
in performance is rooted in staff productivity, which grew by 34% between 1979 and 
1989190. The start of the recession in 199011 and the increased concern over safety 
reduced the gains achieved, but the overall performance was still impressive. 
Proponents of privatisation felt such an improvement gave an indication of 
potentially larger productivity gains from the full scale privatisation of BR. 
This opinion was reflected by the government, who felt that BR could improve both 
productivity and financial performance. It ultimately envisaged BR, or a large part 
of BR, surviving on no subsidy and making a commercial rate of return on its assets, 
see Foster (1994). This, together with the European Commission directive 911440 and 
Council Regulation No 1893f91, 
(1) Member states must establish separate accounts for infrastructure and for 
train operations. 
(2) Operating companies providing international rail passenger transport are to 
have transit rights over Member States railway networks by the 1st January, 
1993. 
has been the stimulus for the Railways Act 1993. 
2. THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED INTHE RAILWAYS ACT 1993 
This section presents a general overview of the proposals, for a comprehensive account 
of the proposals see Shires et a1 (1994). 
2.1 A GENERAL OVERMEW _ * 
Rather than privatise BR as a vertically integrated company, the government has 
split BR into two parts, infrastructure and operations. The provision and operation 
of rail infrastructure (track, simalling etc ... ) becoming the responsibility of Railtrack. 
Initially, Railtrack will rema& in the public sector, but is still expectkd t o  act as a 
commercial organisation, recovering its full costs and earning a rate of return (5.6% 
initially, but e;entually 8%) from charges it levies on operators. It is envisaged that 
Railtrack will eventually be privatised. Railtrack's other responsibilities include 
arranging the maintenance of the infrastructure, monitoring ofon-track safety and 
the timetabling of all services across the network. 
By creating Railtrack the government has retained the infrastructure as a natural 
monopoly and eradicated the 'sunk cost' element it would otherwise represent for new 
entrants into the rail market. The government sees this reduction in an entrant's 
'sunk costs' as a vital ingredient for allowing competition on the railways. Entrants' 
'sunk costs' will be reduced even further with the creation of Rolling Stock companies 
(ROSCOs), that will offer a range of rolling stock for operators to lease. 
On the operating side, both the Freight and Parcels divisions will be sold outright. 
Trainload Freight and Railfreight Distribution's Contract Services division will be 
formed into three new competing companies organised along geographical lines based 
around a North East, South East and WesffScotland division. Each division will have 
access to its own maintenance depots and rolling stock, and will not be local 
monopolies. The divisions will have t o  negotiate with Railtrack for 'paths' and will 
immediately face 'open access' from other freight hauliers. 
Railfreight Distribution's European business will be managed through the start-up 
phase by BR and privatised as soon as possible, once the key Channel Tunnel freight 
services are established. The government is also inviting proposals from the private 
sector to participate in the Freightliner network (existing losses prohibit outright 
privatisation). The Parcels sector will be privatised as two separate parts, Red Star 
and Rail Express Systems (an attempt to sell Red Star has already failed). 
Looking a t  the passenger side 25 Train Operating Companies O C s )  have been 
created, reflecting the number of profit centres that existrd under BR (see appendix 
one for a list of TOCs and their main characteristics). These TOCs will eventually be 
franchised out to private companies. At the moment the TOCs are trading, within the 
remnants of BR, as Train Operating Units (TOCs), therefore, to simplify matters I will 
only use the term TOCs throughout the rest of this working paper. The Office of 
Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) will set minimum standards in terms of 
frequency, reliability and overcrowding and stipulate maximum fares. It will also 
want to be satisfied that potential franchisees meet al l  the safety criteria that 
presently exist. For some Intercity routes, franchisees will be expected to pay for 
their franchises, whilst on loss-making routes the 'lowest subsidy offered' will be the 
criterion. However, the latest set of infrastructure charges published by Railtrack 
make all routes loss-making (with the possible exception of Gatwick). Any franchise 
not let will continue to be operated by the British Railways Board (BRB). 
OPRAF will then have to negotiate a contract with Railtrack, for paths and the 
appropriate charges for the new franchisees. From April (1994) the TOCs have 
operated as independent subsidiaries of BR. By the end of 1995 the first franchises 
will come into existence. Rather than franchise the whole network together, the 
government has earmarked six 'shadow franchises' to form the first wave of 
franchises. These comprise: 'Gatwick Express', 'London, Tilbury and Southend', 'South 
Western', 'Scotrail', 'East Coast Mainline' and the 'Great Western'. The new railway 
system will also incorporate an 'open access' policy. This will allow other operators 
(possibly other franchisees) to operate services on any section of the network, 
providing they satisfy all the regulations set down by the Regulator (including safety) 
and have negotiated 'access contracts' with Railtrack. However, it is envisaged that 
'open access' will be delayed for two years to allow rail franchisees t o  overcome initial 
stumbling blocks, a so-called 'honeymoon period'. 
The final player in the government's Railways Act 1993 is the Regulator, whose 
general duties are outlined in section four of the Railways Act 1993. These duties 
include: 
(I) Competition and Access - The Regulator must ensure that Railtrack does not 
abuse its monopoly position and does not discriminate between different train 
operators. As such all access agreements will be subject to his approval and 
constant monitoring. 
(2) Licensing and Closure -All operating licenses are issued by the Regulator who 
will have to be satisfied that the operators are 'safety validated' and properly 
insured. The Regulator will also have responsibility for the closure of lines, 
attaching conditions to closures in certain circumstances. 
(3) User Interests and General Duties -The Railways Act 1993 states that part of 
the Regulatois duties is "to protect the interests of users of railway services". 
The main voice for users in the new rail set up are the Rail Users Consultative 
Committees (RUCC), who succeed the Transport Users Consultative 
Committees. It is hoped that both the Regulator and the RUCC's will act 
together to protect rail user interests. The Railways Act 1993 also places great 
emphasis on the Regulator promoting 'efficiency and economy on the part of 
persons providing railway services', on developing the 'rail network to the 
greatest extent that he considers economically practicable' and Yo enable 
persons providing railway services to plan the future of their businesses, with 
a reasonable degree of assurance'. 
3. RAIL PRIVATISATION ELSEWHERE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section examines rail privatisation elsewhere in the world and tries to draw some 
parallels with the proposed rail privatisation in the UK. In all, six privatisatione and 
proposed privatisations are examined, namely Argentina, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden. In addition, the experience of AMTRACK in 
the US, as  a publicly owned passenger operator using private infrastructure, is noted. 
The examples cover a wide range of railway types, so in many cases we are not 
comparing like with like. However, a number of lessons can be drawn from these 
examples which can be applied to rail privatisation in the UK. 
3.2 ARGENTINA RAILWAYS 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Until 1989, railways in Argentina operated as a nationalised industry (Ferrocariles 
Argentinos, FA) organised into six main divisions. This organisation was the result 
of a variety of government and business constructed railways, that in 1946147 were 
nationalised by the Argentine government. 
Despite large reductions in route-kms and staff, from 45,000 km to 29,000 km and 
210,000 staff to 85,000 staff, by 1989 the railways were reaching a crisis. Market 
share was around 8% of the freight and inter-city passenger market and government 
subsidy was £212 million (revenue contributions) and £150 million (capital 
expenditure). Over half the locomotive fleet was unserviceable, with 50% of the routes 
subject to speed and axle restrictions. 
To arrest the decline in performance the government of President Carlos Menem, at  
the instigation of the World Bank, decided in 1989, to offer franchises for the 
operation of freight services over large areas of the rail network. The infrastructure 
and rolling stock were to remain in the ownership of the government, whilst a 
government regulatory authority and an independent safety authority were to be set 
up. The elements of the franchising are, 
(a) The franchisee rents both the infrastructure and rolling stock from the 
government during the franchise period, at the end of which the government 
retains possession. The franchises are for 30 years with 10 year renewal 
options. 
(b) The only operating obligation on the franchisee is one of maximum charge 
level (still a high level). Also included in the bid is a proposal for investment 
over the franchise period and an obligation to maintain infrastructure in 
operating condition. 
(c) The franchisee will have to implement an investment plan negotiated during 
the bidding process, subject to negotiation after five years. 
(d) If the franchisee rescinds on his contract he will lose a guaranteed amount, but 
will recover the current value of investment, minus a share of 40% to 50%, as 
unique indemnification. 
(e) The franchisee must allow 'open access', for which they will receive a payment. 
The franchise is awarded using a points system, which awards points after 
considering the previous experience of the franchisee, the proposed investment, the 
number of railwaymen to be absorbed and the amount bid for the franchise. 
There are no explicit subsidies being offered but low charges for both infrastructure 
and leasing mean an implicit subsidy is on offer, which according to Muller (1992) is, 
"..equivalent to more than 40% of annual revenue." 
The overall franchise strategy was reached after consultation with the World Bank, 
who besides advice also gave US $300 million in loans towards restructuring the rail 
system. Apart from the franchising of freight services the other planks of the policy 
were. 
(a) Separation of passenger services into commercial and socially necessary 
services. 
(b) Creation of a Buenos Aires Metropolitan Transport Authority to coordinate 
commuter services to the region. 
(c) Reducing staff levels and reforming working practices. 
(d) The setting up of a property unit for the sale of excess assets. 
3.2.2 Results 
Of the six franchises on offer only one, the Belgrano line, has received no bids. The 
other five have either been franchised out or are having bids assessed. The majority 
of the franchiseeshidders are consortia with only limited experience of.large-scale rail 
operations. The exception to this rule being Canadian National and Conrail who form 
part of the consortium running the Roca system and the Urquiza line respectively. 
As regards passenger services, only the Buenos Aires - Mar del Plata route is 
considered profitable, with four bids being considered. Routes outside of metropolitan 
areas will be offered to provincial gwernment to run. If the provincial government 
declines the service will be closed. The suburban services serving Buenos Aires will 
be franchised, with the key measure being the 'lowest subsidy' bid. 
3.2.3 Summary 
As yet it is impossible to evaluate the structural changes that have taken place within 
Argentina's railways. There is no doubt that Argentina has embarked upon the 
largest rail privatisation scheme in the world. However, the likelihood of success 
must be questioned given the implementation time period of three years and the 
limited experience of the franchisees. 
Both Muller (19921, and Ridley and Terry (1992) predict operational cost reductions 
because of a change in ownership. They also forecast a shift towards an American- 
style trunk-haul operation and the resultant closure of unprofitable routes and 
reduction in staff. 
The crucial element will be the level of investment by both the government and the 
franchisees. No doubt investment to maintain present operations and standards will 
take place, but whether the investment necessary to promote strong traffic increases 
will take place is a different matter. Given the state of the present track and the cost 
of upgrading it, a scenario of private railways continuing until great investment is 
unavoidable after which franchises are returned to the government, is not 
unforeseeable. 
3.3 GERMANY 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Before January 1 1994, German railways came under two national organisations, 
Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB-former West German railway) and Deutsche Reichsbahn 
(DR-former East German railway), both operating in their former territories. They 
now operate under the same banner, Deutsche Bahn AG (German Rail plc), and have 
been split into an entrepreneurial area (responsible for train operations) and a public 
sector area (responsible for non train tasks), destined to be privatised. 
This reform process is rooted in the final report of the governmental railway 
commission presented in December 1991. The commission, set up in July 1989, was 
initially intended to examine the future of DB, but was extended to include DR with 
the fall of the Berlin wall later that year. The commission noted two main points, 
(1) DB's market share was 6% of the passenger market and 23% for the freight 
market. DR's market share was greater, but due to increased availability of 
lorry and car, was declining fast. 
(2) Low investment in DR, the result of a weak economy, means that DM100 bn 
may have to be spent to restore the DR network to reasonable condition. 
It concluded that if change were not implemented then government subsidy would 
reach unbearable levels within 10 years. 
On July 15, 1992, the government initiated a strategy that would eventually result 
in three commercial businesses, passenger, freight and infrastructure, all of which 
would be earmarked for privatisation. The restructuring process can be seen 
diagramatically in the Railway Gazette International (July, 1993), and is described 
fully in the next section. 
3.3.2 The Restructuring Proposals: 
By January 1,1994, the two railways had merged into one Federal Railway Property, 
which itself was divided into two separate areas with responsibility for their own 
budgetary and accounts; 
(1) An Entrepreneurial Area - consisting of all transport and related business 
activities, and infrastructure management, construction, operation and 
maintenance. 
(2) A Public Area - consisting of all the state tasks formerly handled by DB and 
DR, the administration of the debts of the single Federal Railway Property, the 
administration of land holdings not required for rail operations and the 
administration of DB staff who remain civil servants. 
After January 1, 1994, the entrepreneurial area became DBAG, a public limited 
company with share capital, owned wholly by the Federal Government and divided 
up into three business sectors; passenger; business; infrastructure, a t  regional level. 
That is to say that the 15 regional headquarters of DBAG will be organised on a 
sector basis. 
Another organisation will be created, a Federal Railway Office, to handle state tasks 
such as approving construction plans for a new railway line. The rest of the public 
area will remain in the Federal Railway Property. 
By 1997, the government envisages the three business sectors of DBAG being 
transformed into public limited companies, allowing the participation of third parties. 
DBAG would therefore act as a holding company until 2002 when it is envisaged that 
the three sectors would become fully independent, with their shares offered for sale 
to the public. 
3.3.3 Main Issues Of The Restructuring: 
(i) Article 87 
This article of the basic law required railways to be part of the federal administration, 
so preventing even a formal privatisation. This has since been modified to enable 
restructuring to commence. 
(ii) Civil Servants 
DB's initial establishment as a state enterprise subjected i t  to public service 
regulations and budget laws. The result was that 130,000 DB personnel were classed 
as civil servants, with employment guaranteed for their working lives and generous 
pensions. It was also felt that the 270,000 other employees of DB and DR were 
entitled to job preservation, as  a consequence no jobs will be lost from the creation of 
DBAG. 
The result has been DBAG taking over only those employees necessary for its 
operations, with the remaining civil servants remaining with the Federal Railway 
Ofice and Property. Three remaining mechanisms will be used t o  adapt the civil 
servants terms and conditions, see Railway Gazette International (July 1993). These 
are: 
(a) Voluntary surrender of civil service status at  their request. 
(b) Suspension of civil service status for a given time, in which there will be a 
normal employee relationship with DBAG. 
(c) Secondment of the civil servant to DBAG, which would pay the Federal 
Railway Property only the salary of a normal employee under market 
conditions. 
(iii) Debt Burden And Investment 
The historic debt of both DB and DR was forecast to reach DM70bn by the end of 
1993. The Federal government recognised that DBAG could not sustain this level of 
debt for long and released both DB and DR not only from their historical debt, but 
from liabilities attributable to excessive staff, and from obligations arising from 
environmental responsibilities. In addition the government has also accepted 
responsibility for the DMlOObn worth of investment necessary to reconstruct DR. - 
DBAG has been released from the restrictions imposed by public service and budget 
laws. The company's assets have been revalued a t  around 22% of their present 
DBDR level, and DBAG was launched with no capital debts. 
(iv) Regionalisation 
This process removes the power to determine local rail services and the responsibility 
to finance them from a national to a regional level (to state governments known as 
Lander). This is a key feature of the restructuring process, see Ridley and Terry 
(1992). Previously, the Lander were a powerful lobby for the retention and 
improvement of rail services, payment for which came from Federal funds. Now the 
Lander have to set a service level and enter into a contract with a railway operator. 
Three scenarios have been discussed: 
(a) The Lander arrange for DBAG to run local or regional train services, specified 
on a contract basis. 
(b) The Lander establish their own rail operating subsidiary to operate on DBAG's 
lines. 
(c) The Lander purchases lines from DBAG, and then lease them to third parties 
via municipal corporations. 
Previously, DB and DR provided such services in return for a PSO grant from the 
Federal government of around DM6bn (1993). The Lander have asked for DM14bn, 
plus the continuation of the Geimeindeverkehrsfmanzierungsgesetz (GVFG), around 
DM6bn a year, for joint Federamander investment in local and regional transport 
projects. This amount is seen as unacceptable, especially given Heinz Durr's 
(Chairman of DBAG) statement that the DM6bn paid to DB and DR in 1993 would 
be sufficient for DBAG to maintain regional services, given the expected cost 
reductions in DBAG's operations. 
To placate the situation, the Federal government is to continue funding DBAG 
directly for regional rail services till a t  least 1995, when regionalisation will be 
examined again. 
(v) Open Access 
In principle, any domestic rail operator or foreign operator (providing open access is 
reciprocated in their country of origin) can run trains over the German rail network. 
Access price charging is envisaged as adopting a market approach, with charges set 
according to 'revenue potential' on the line; the quality of service demanded; wear and 
tear inflicted upon the track; the relevant competitive position and the amount of 
excess capacity on the network. 
The Lander have expressed their wish to see fxed infrastructure user charges. 
However, DBAG see this lack of charge flexibility as reducing the scope for efficient, 
market led infrastructure management. 
(vi) Paying for the Infrastructure 
A decision made by the Federal Government on February 17 1993, established an 
obligation for the Federal Republic to contribute financially to investment in 
infrastructure. DBAG will pay back investments financed by the Federal government 
up to the amount of depreciation that both parties consider to be necessary, (Railway 
Gazette International July, 1993). For lines considered indispensable, DBAG will 
borrow in the capital markets. 
The Lander feel that, over all responsibility for infrastructure investment should rest 
with the Federal government, preferring the government rather than DBAG to retain 
ownership of the infrastructure. 
3.3.4 Results 
It is too early to comment on the effect restructuring has had, however DBAG has 
produced some forecasts for costs and revenues over the next 10 years. It predicts 
that Federal subsidies will be around DM428bn compared to DM569bn without the 
reforms, saving around DM100bn. The savings will be achieved through greater 
eff ic ien and increased traffic. For example, DBAG's business plan projects savings 
of DM36bn from rationalising train crews and DM7bn through competitive purchasing 
and rationalisation of maintenance. 
3.4 JAPANESE RAILWAYS 
3.4.1 Introduction: 
Japanese railways were reorganised in 1949 with the creation of the state-owned 
corporation, Japanese National Railways (JNR) operating a nationwide network of 
about 21,000 km. In addition to JNR there are 15 major private railways and 161 
smaller railway operators in Japan. The private railways are to be found in the A 
metropolitan areas where high densities of commuter traffic make them quite 
profitable and non-rail opportunities such as property development exist. 
Railways have always played an important role in Japan, more so than in other first 
world countries, see Table 3.1, 
Table 3.1: International Comparison of Rail's Share of Passenger Market 
Source: Quoted by Maeda, 1993. 
Japan (JNR) 
(Private) 
'U.K. 
West 
Germany 
France 
USA 
Despite suffering from a 42% fall in ridership, in absolute terms railways in Japan are 
still extremely important. The main reasons for such a strong use of railways by 
passengers have been identified as high population densities, the issuing of 
'commuting passes' by Japanese firms, until recently a poor road network (due to the 
mountainous terrain) and low levels of car ownership. The development of the high 
speed Shinkansen network in the 1960's has also contributed to JNR maintaining 
relatively high passenger market shares e.g. the Shinkansen carries over 90% of 
passenger demand in the inter city urban market between Tokyo and Osaka (560 
km). 
In contrast JNR's share of the freight market fell considerably from the 1960's 
onwards, see Table 3.2. 
1965 
45 
2 1  
10 
11 
2 1 
2 
1970 
32 
17 
9 
8 
12 
1 
1975 
33 
15 
9 
7 
12 
i 
1980 
25 
15 
7 
7 
11 
1 
1985 
23 
15 
7 
8 
10 
1 
r/, Change 
-49 
-29 
-30 
-27 
-52 
-50 
Table 3.2: International Comparison of Rail's Share of Freight Transport Market 
96 in Tonne Kh4 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 % Change 
Japan (JNR) 30 18 13 8 5 -83 
(Private) 1 - - - - - 
U.K. 21 19 15 12 12 -62 
West 34 33 26 25 25 -26 
Germany 44 37 35 32 3 1 -30 
France 43 40 39 38 37 -14 
USA 
Source: Quoted by Maeda, 1993. 
The main factor operating against rail in the freight market is the fact that being an 
island country, most raw materials are imported. The most efficient mode is therefore 
ship and as a result the majority of heavy industries are located on or near the coast. 
Despite the favourable conditions for passenger traffic, by the 1980's JNR was 
reaching a financial crisis point. The result of which was to be the complete 
restructuring of JNR in 1986. 
3.4.2 The JNR Restructuring Act 1986: 
Background: 
Table 3.3 sets out the financial performance of JNR from the 1960's (all figures in 
Billion of yen). From 1964, when JNR recorded its first deficit, JNR's financial 
position grew steadily worse. The annual deficit was 123 billion Yen in 1965 and by 
1985 was some 2,100 billion Yen (excluding subsidy), whilst the long term debt had 
grown from 1,110 billion Yen to 23,561 billion Yen. The major cause of this huge long 
term debt was continued construction of new lines throughout the period being 
examined. Pressure for the constructions came mainly from Japanese politicians. who 
regarded railway's main role as one of socio-economic development.--Since JNR, in 
principle, was fiscally independent as a public corporation, JNR had to borrow to cover 
the operating deficit and the construction of new lines. The consequential repayments 
and interest charges put a crippling strain upon JNR e.g. 1,220 billion Yen paid in 
interest in 1985 (35% of operating revenue). 
Table 3.3: Financial Performance of JNR 
Note : , Total of subsidy between 1949-67 
: Numbers in 0 represent minus 
: All figures are expressed in money term of each year (in billions of Yen) 
Source: Quoted in Maeda, 1993 
Year 
Total Revenue 
Passenger 
Freight 
Miscellaneous 
Subsidy 
Total Cost 
Staff 
Material 
Interest 
Depreciation 
Other 
Net Profit 
Long Term 
Debt 
Total Subsidies 
No. of Staff 
(000's) 
Further financial pressure resulted from overstaffing, with staff levels of 469,693 in 
1966 and 276,774 in 1985. This resulted in staff costs of some 2,300 billion Yen in 
1985, or some 70 % of operating revenue. Together with a 'gold plated' pension 
scheme, labour costs were pushing JNR further and further into fmancial crisis. 
Another factor increasingly blamed for the financial crisis was that of 'weak 
management'. After the first recorded deficit in 1964, JNR's management team tried 
to improve and recover its financial performance through a series of reconstruction 
plans. In total five reconstruction plans were followed, all of which were unsuccessful 
and abandoned on the way. The continuing theme of these plans was to aim for a 
balanced budget through a combination of increased fares and increased traffic, with 
an element of government debt support in some of the plans. However a combination 
of adverse public opinion, weak government support and strong unions (failure of 
Productivity Improvement), ensured that these plans were never successful. 
1970 
1,146 
846 
254 
33 
12 
1,297 
573 
374 
152 
202 
(3) 
(152) 
2,604 
12 
460 
1965 
634 
412 
198 
238 
- 
757 
310 
231 
65 
153 
0 
(123) 
1,110 
141 
462 
The final factor that led to the reorganisation of JNR was the financial performance 
of the private railways, see Table 3.4. 
1975 
1,821 
1,315 
242 
67 
198 
2,736 
1,266 
793 
406 
280 
(9) 
(915) 
6,779 
268 
430 
1980 
2,964 
2,242 
330 
102 
289 
3,972 
1,859 
1,231 
477 
398 
(8) 
(1,008) 
14,399 
677 
414 
1985 
3,553 
2,942 
186 
183 
242 
5,401 
2,302 
1,461 
1,220 
589 
(172) 
(1,848) 
23,561 
600 
277 
1986 
3,605 
3,027 
167 
222 
188 
4,966 
2,115 
1,197 
1,325 
668 
(339) 
(1,361) 
25,065 
378 
224 
Table 3.4: Financial and Operational Performance of JNR and Private Rail 
Operators 
Note: 15 Rail represents the 15 biggest private railways. 
Revenue and costs are actual results. 
Only JNR's results are for rail operations only, the others include non rail 
contributions. 
No. of operators 
Route km 
No. of staff (000's) 
Vehicle km (Mil.) 
No. of passengers 
(Mil.) 
Passenger km (Mil.) 
Total Revenue 
Railway's Revenue 
Railway's Costs 
Railway's Profit 
Rail's costs/ 
Rail's revenue 
Vehicle km1Staff 
Source: Quoted by Maeda, 1993. 
The apparent financial viability of the private railways and higher labour productivity 
led for calls from the government and the public for increased productivity from JNR 
and financial viability via reorganisation of JNR. This opinion was slightly biased 
given that private railways gained over half of their profits from the hotels, 
department stores and real estates that they have developed around their railways 
(see Table 3.5). JNR was prohibited from these activities by law. 
JNR 
1985 
1 
20,479 
277 
3,949 
6,941 
197,463 
3,605 
3,311 
5,401 
(2,090) 
74% 
14.3 
15 RAIL 
1990 
15 
2,864 
56 
1,737 
7,835 
112,745 
2,284 
1,114 
963 
152 
42% 
31.0 
SUBWAY 
1990 
13 
515 
31 
515 
4,783 
NI A 
NIA 
610 
558 
53 
47% 
17.2 
OTHERS 
1990 
100 
3,464 
20 
273 
1,055 
NIA 
NIA 
161 
157 
4 
62% 
16.1 
I 
Table 3.5: Private Railways Revenue Breakdown 
Source: Ridley and Terry, 1992 
For a very detailed look at  the implications of the act and the reasons for the 
proposals contained in it see Maeda (1993). In this section I will present a more 
summarised version. The overall purpose of the act was to remove the special position 
of Japanese railways in law and government. Instead of having an object to, 'improve 
the welfare of the general public' its new mission was to, 'respond to market needs 
and establish effective management'. As a direct result of this the JNR was separated 
from the civil service; government responsibility for the construction of new railways 
was taken away; no specific legislative approval was required for fare rises. JNR was 
fully capitalised by the government who will eventually list the stocks on the Tokyo 
Stock market. However, up to press only JR East has been sold, but for all practical 
purposes JNR has been privatised. 
The blue paper 'JNR Reformation' had set the format for the JNR Restructuring Act. 
Despite forecasting a reduction in rail's share of the passenger market (see Table 3.61, 
the blue paper still sees rail's role as  one of dominailce in the inter city market (300- 
700 km) and commuter market. It concentrated on two major reforms (1) the 
establishment of a truly freelindependent management (2) restructuring the railways 
into regions as opposed to the national organisation that existed at  that time. 
Table 3.6: Traffic Forecasts 
Source: Quoted by Maeda, 1993 
." 
The blue paper identified several reasons for managerial underperformance within 
JNR. Firstly the strict regulation of JNR and its image as  a 'public good' resulted in 
delayed fare changes and the construction of unprofitable lines, which went against 
management judgement. Secondly, lack of managerial independence in all aspects of 
operations including wage negotiations led to ambiguous management and low morale. 
Thirdly, the restriction placed on JNR as regards development of retail business and 
real estates severely restricted the opportunities open to JNR. 
a) Forecast 
Total 
all ra~lway 
JNR 
Commuter 
Non Commuter 
~ncludlng 
Shznkansen 
Pnvate rallways 
Cars 
h r s  
Ship 
b) Results 
Total 
all rallway 
JNR 
Commuter 
Non commuter 
Including 
Shlnkansen 
Private rallways 
Car 
Air 
Ship 
The nationwide organisation also received wide criticism in the blue paper. Problems 
it identified included diseconomies of management, excessive cross subsidy that 
distorted information on costs and revenues, a lack of incentive to compete with other 
transport modes and a lack of competition between JNR managers themselves. The 
blue paper suggested that a structure of regional privatisation would create more 
responsive operations. 
1) 1990 
Demand 
921430 
317833 
185114 
79879 
55564 
49671 
132719 
554737 
43557 
5303 
1) 1975 
Demand 
710711 
323800 
215289 
75985 
85986 
53318 
108511 
360868 
19148 
6895 
Share % 
34 
20 
9 
6 
5 
14 
60 
5 
1 
Share % 
46 
30 
11 
12 
8 
15 
51 
3 
1 
% change 
199011983 
112 
99 
96 
102 
87 
98 
103 
120 
142 
93 
2) 2000 
Demand 
977688 
308854 
180289 
75071 
50198 
55020 
128565 
609800 
54307 
4727 
2) 1983 
Demand 
821963 
321452 
192906 
78687 
63799 
50440 
128546 
464162 
30627 
5722 
Share '2 
32 
18 
8 
5 
6 
13 
62 
6 
0 
Share % 
39% 
23% 
10% 
8% 
6% 
16% 
56% 
4% 
1% 
r;l change 
200011983 
119 
96 
93 
95 
79 
109 
100 
131 
177 
83 
The implementation of the JNR Restructuring act has followed the blue paper 
proposals very closely. JNR has been split up into six geographical operating 
passenger companies (Hokkaido, Shikoku, Kyusyu, East Japan, Central Japan and 
West Japan). These are vertically integrated companies and are known as JR's. Each 
area has been designed so that between 95-98% of traffic completes its journey within 
each area. A nationwide freight company has been set up, the Japan Freight Railway 
Company. This only owns 80 km of track and rents access space from passenger 
companies, the rental fee being calculated on the basis of avoidable costs. The freight 
structure is national rather than regional because the government felt greater co- 
ordination was required with other modes at both ends of the feeders and because 
some 60% of all freight traffic crosses the border of passenger companies. 
Also hived off into separate companies have been research and development (RTRIF), 
Railway Telecommunications (RT) and Railway Information System (RIS). 
A JNR Settlement Corporation (JNRSC) has been set up and is legally responsible for 
the re~avment of most of JNR's long term debt and the relocation of redundant staff. 
Out of &e 25.6 trillion Yen of long tern debt attributed to JNRSC, 2.9 trillion yen are 
assumed to be reimbursed from the Shinkansen Holding Corporation (SHC), 7.7 
trillion from the sales of JNR owned non railway real estates and the 1.2 trillion Yen 
from the sale of JNR stocks. The remaining 13.8 trillion yen will be borne by the 
government. 
The SHC, referred to above is a government agency which owns the infrastructure of 
the Shinkanson and leases out these lines to the three operating companies through 
which they run, for 5.7 trillion yen. It also is responsible for the JNRSC 2.9 trillion 
Yen of long term debt. 
Onlv three of the JR's are ~rofitable. namelv JREast. JR-Central and JR-West. This 
is kainly due to their running throigh thekost  densely populated areas and feeling 
the benefit of staff reductions and improved management. This improvement in 
profitability prompted the three companies to buy the; sections of shinkinsen, though 
a t  a price that represents their commercial worth not their book values. 
The other three JR's receive financial help from two sources, the Three Islands 
Companies Fund' and the Management Stabilising Funds (MSF). The former is 
specifically to help with investment and was set up by the government in a political 
deal termed 'consolation money'. The MSF is a direct subsidy to supplement the 
revenues of the three Islands. The fund is in the form of the debt of JNRSC to the 
three island companies, totalling some 1.3 trillion Yen: 682.8 billion Yen to JR 
Hokkaido, 208.2 billion Yen to JR Shikoku and 387.7 billion Yen to JR Kyusyu. The 
debt will be repaid to each company in 10 years a t  an annual interest rate of 7.3%. 
Only the interest accruing from the fund will be used to supplement the revenue. 
Other financial help for all the JR's comes in the form of central and local government 
grants towards new high-speed projects. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) has 
established a subsidy rule through which the construction costs of new lines are 
shared between JRs (50%), central government (40%) and local government (10%). 
For new stations the share is 50% 25% and 25%. Subsidy for other Inter city projects 
has to be negotiated on a case by case basis. 
3.4.3 Results 
A thorough breakdown of the results are presented in chapter four of Maeda, but a 
summary of the main results can be found in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Key Financial and Operational Indices of JNR 
- - 
Source: Quoted in Maeda, 1993 
The results are impressive for both freight and passenger traffic but especially for 
passenger. Revenues for passenger tr&c have risen 46.6% from 1984 t o  1991, whilst 
costs have fallen by 24.4% during the same period. Another significant figure is the 
number of staff, falling by 45.2% to 138,901. However, it is important to point out 
that strictly speaking we are not comparing like with like here. A change in the 
product mix and concentration on key corridors has resulted in some low profit lines 
being withdrawn and others opened up. When looking at  the number of staff, it 
should be borne in mind that these reductions in staff numbers have been brought 
about partly by sending staff to subsidiaries and affiliated companies. This 'making 
best use of redundancies' is common practice in Japan, and by no means is confined 
to the railway industry only. 
Revenue 
Costs 
Traffic units 
Train km 
No. of staff 
Staff costs 
% change 
46.6 
-24.4 
27.2 
32.8 
-45.2 
-33.0 
Passenger 
1984 1991 
Units: Revenue, costs --billion yen 
Traffic units -- passenger km and tonne km in millions 
Train kms -- in thousands 
2691 
2988 
194180 
515522 
253684 
1799 
Revenud 
Cost 
? change 
-3.9 
-50.4 
19.2 
-10.3 
-77.5 
-63.0 
3946 
2257 
247031 
684368 
138901 
1206 
Freight 
1984 1991 
202 
386 
22485 
1017800 
46600 
240 
0.90 
195 
191 
26791 
91329 
10489 
89 
1.75 94.1% 0.52 1.02 93.75 
3.4.4 Summary 
The turn around in the performance of JNR is impressive, although it is tempered 
somewhat if one considers the size and availability of subsidy that still exists. This 
is a reflection of the political importance that railways still have and their importance 
in the nation's economic planning. The effect of physical factors in JNR's new found 
profitability should not be underestimated. As Ridley and Terry (1992) point out, 
"In many areas there is extreme pressure on land, which makes new surface 
transport infrastructure expensive, slow and difficult to achieve ... By the same 
token, the high value of land opens up the possibilities for deals with 
developers, farmers, and existing owners who might benefit from the new rail 0 
construction taking place." - 7 
The main elements in the turn around of JNR can be summarised into several points. 4 
(1) Separation of long term problems - 
The repayment of long term debt and the redeployment of redundant labour 
was made the responsibility of JNRSC, whilst the shinkansen infrastructure 
was handed over to SHC. This ensured a smooth transfer and established a 
sound basis of operation even during the reconstruction of JNR. 
(2) Corporatisation and Privatisation 
This brought a commercial attitude to both managers and staff. 
(3) Deregulation 
The separation from government control brought new freedom to managers and 
increased their accountability and freedom to develop other businesses, such 
as retail and property. 
(4) Withdrawal of special local lines 
- A total of 3,160 kilometres of extremely unprofitable lines were withdrawn. 
3.5 NETHERLANDS 
3.5.1 Introduction 
At the moment railways in the Netherlands are subject to a high degree of 
government intervention a t  every level. Netherlands Railways (NS) does not have the 
freedom to decide its own fares, levels of service or investment plans. Government 
influence does not end there, but extends to the operational aspects of NS too. As 
Huisman (1993) acknowledges, 
"The present arrangements between the government and Netherlands Railways 
include a mixture of responsibilities without, however, offering Netherlands Railways 
adequate incentives to serve its market in the best way." 
19 
This type of arrangement is a result of the Dutch government's concern for a national 
strategic transport plan. However, several recent events have initiated reform in 
public transport administration, resulting in a more market oriented, independent NS. 
These events include (1) the Wijffels Committee report (1992), that urged the 
government to afford NS the scope to function as an independent business and to 
create distinct organisational divisions within NS, (2) EC Directive No 911440 and 
Council Regulation No 1893191, whose main provisions are for the separation of rail 
operations and infrastructure, and 'open access' on rail networks, (3) the governments 
belief that the transport system underpins sustainable economic growth. This last 
point was recognised by the government and NS as early as 1988. NS put forward 
the RAIL 21 plan which aimed to double passenger traffic by the year 2005 with no 
increase in subsidy (see appendix three of Preston et al, 1994). The government in 
turn promised to introduce a number of measures to restrain car growth i.e. inter- 
urban road pricing. However, despite NS increasing passenger kilometres by 40% 
since then, the government has still to deliver its promises on car restraint. 
3.5.2 The Government's Proposals 
The gist of the government's proposals is that NS will retain full responsibility for the 
operation of rail services, with the freedom to set levels of service, fares and 
investment necessary for operations. All other aspects of rail provision such as 
infrastructure management will be managed by the government or the government 
via a third party. Some of the main elements of the proposals are set out below. 
(1) Infrastructure 
The Dutch government will have responsibility for the development, management and 
financing of the railway infrastructure. However, it will assign the management of 
the infrastructure in the short and medium term to an administrative unit of NS, 
known as NS Infrastructure (NSI). The terms and conditions will be laid down in 
contracts between the government and NSI, and will contain incentives to encourage 
efficient performance by NSI. NSI will also have to tender work out. 
The Dutch government will retain a long-term role in infrastructure planning, to 
complement its integrated planning policy. That is to say rail infrastmcture planning 
will be related to the planning of other transport modes, the environment and of land- 
use. 
(2) Capacity Management 
The government recognises that capacity management is an integral part of NS's 
operations. As such it will leave it with NS but to ensure impartiality (to allow open 
access) will create a distinct organisation within NS to manage capacity; will set out 
allocation rules; create a regulatory body to ensure impartiality; and operate an - 
appeals mechanism. 
(3) Freight Services 
At present NS Freight has complete commercial freedom, and is able to set freight 
rates as it choses. The Dutch goverment eventually wants NS Freight to operate as 
an independent business unit on the open market, with its own legal status.. One of 
the essential elements in freight's future is the ability to attract and handle new 
traffic. The RAIL 21 CARGO plan was submitted in 1990 for just this purpose. This 
plan included a new freight route between Rotterdam and Germany (since approved) 
and the development of international inter-modal services. 
(4) Passenger Services 
The Dutch government envisages a profitable and market oriented NS passenger 
division, responsible for its own fares, levels of service and investment plans. At the 
moment the government has a contract with NS, under which NS is promised a real 
level of support in return for a minimum level of service (maximum fares are also 
stipulated). 
In future the government hopes to separate the commercial and the social aspect of 
NS rail operations through the contracting out of transport services which are not 
commercially viable for NS, but which nevertheless are socially desirable. This would 
then allow NS to concentrate on its commercial operations, aided and abetted by the 
government's Second Transport Structure Plan. The aim of this plan is tofcreate 
favourable conditions for public passenger transport through urban planning, car- 
parking policy and pricing differentials between car and public transport. . 
To obtain a situation where government fmances are only required for infrastructure 
investment and the contract sector, with passenger services being profitable, the 
government has identified a six year program from 1994-2000. The program has 
three main components, (1) An improvement in NS's efficiency, (2) NS will have to 
increase fares in real terms, (3) NS will have to consider cutting unprofitable services. 
(5) Finance and Investment 
At present the government subsidy to NS is equal to NLG 1,600m per year, consisting 
of over NLG 1,000 m for infrastructure maintenance, some NLG 450m for operations 
and another NLG 150m for infrastructure and capacity management etc .... The 
portion of this subsidy that the government wishes to eradicate is the NLG 450m 
operating subsidy. The government feels that this could be achieved by its six year 
program e.g. 
(1) efficiency improvements of 2% per year would save NLG 40m per year, (2) a fare 
increase of 1% would improve NS results by NLG 15m, (3) network rationalisation of 
non-profitable services would save NLG 5m, resulting in savings 6f NLG 60 million 
in the first year. By the sixth year these measures together could result in savings 
of around NLG 400 million. 
While pruning back operating subsidy the government has made a commitment to 
increasing real investment in NS. Until 1988, investment in NS was around NLG 
700m per annum. In order to achieve a doubling of traffic by 2005 investment will 
have to rise to NLG 2500m per annum, expanding the intercity network from two to 
four tracks and rolling stock from 2250 passenger carrying vehicles (1988) to 3375 in 
200012005. Given that half of the fleet will by then comprise of double decker vehicles 
(so the number of seats will have increased by 90%) only a small increase in vehicle 
utilisation will be necessary to acheive the doubling of trafic (see appendix three of 
Preston et al, 1994) 
3.5.3 Conclusions 
The proposals of the Dutch government will clarify the division of responsibilities 
between the government and Netherlands Railways; give financial and commercial 
independence to NS; acheive the EC directive and council regulation; and allow the 
Dutch government to concentrate on the formulation of an integrated transport policy, 
see Huisman (1993). However, without control over fares and service levels, quite 
how the Dutch government intends to achieve this last objective is open to question. 
To be successful the government must ensure that it leaves NS as an independent 
organisation; continues to support and provide quality infrastructure and ensures a 
'level playing field' between different transport modes. 
3.6 NEW ZEALAND RAILWAYS 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Railways in New Zealand have undergone a radical transformation over the past 11 
years. They have developed from a highly protected, overstaffed and loss making 
organisation into a privatised, commercial, profit making organisation, operating in F 
a deregulated market. The evolution process resulted from, firstly, the establishment 
of New Zealand Railways as  a Corporation, secondly, the transformation of this 
corporation into a Limited Company (independent of the government) and thirdly the 
sale to a private consortium led by Wisconsin Central in July 1993. 
3.6.2 New Zealand Railways Corporation 
The New Zealand Railways Corporation RJZRC) came into being with the New 
Zealand Railways Corporation Act 1982. I t  was given a commercial remit, a board of 
directors taken from private industry and perhaps most significant of all a well 
defmed objective: 
"To operate s o ,  that revenue exceeded costs, including interest and 
depreciation." 
Source: Small (1993) 
At the same time the deregulation of the freight market, that made up the bulk of the 
railway's traffic, led to the abandonment of the 150 kilometre distance limit on road 
freight and gave extra incentive to both rail management and unions to embrace 
commercialisation and change. The realisation that the New Zealand government 
were serious in 'cutting off subsidy payments again acted as a spur to improve 
productivity and financial performance. 
The whole emphasis during the eighties was on 'downsizing' and greater 'market led' 
operations. Outside transport management specialists, Booze-Allen and Hsmiliton 
were used to set the 'strategic direction' for the corporation. 
Over 100 projects were set in motion, amongst them: 
(a) The use of 'hub and spoke' networks (as in the airport industry) to  rationalise 
station and freight terminals. This resulted in a system of six hubs and 12 
spokes and allowed the closure of over 300 smaller terminals. d 
P 
(b) Changes in working practices to facilitate one-man train operations and 
increasing average train size (20%). 
(c) The introduction of higher capacity rolling stock. 
(d) Improvements in maintenance regimes for both track and rolling stock. This 
resulted in a reduction of workshops from eight to two and of depots from 32 
to 17. 
(e) Introduction of information technology to improve productivity and marketing 
efforts e.g. AMICUS, a fully integrated system to manage marketing, sales, 
fleet disposition and train operations. 
By 1990 the NZRC was achieving operating profit, but was still short of a net profit 
due to a substantial debt (the result of redundancy payments and the electrification 
of the North Island Main Trunk). In an attempt to ease the transition of NZRC to a 
limited company and then to a PLC, the government transferred the debt to itself. 
The operating side of NZRC was set up as a limited liability company called New 
Zealand Rail Limited (NZRL). NZRC was left with the ownership of the land, road 
passenger business, Speedlink parcel service and other general assets. Land 
necessary for rail operations was rented to NZRL for a nominal rent. 
3.6.3 New Zealand Rail Limited 
Organisation Structure: 
New Zealand Rail's structure is now centred around three business groups who 
operate as  profit centres. These are Railfreight, Passenger and Operations, a resume 
of each follows. 
Railfreight 
This essentially markets freight operations for NZRL and as  such is the largest 
revenue earner. It  is composed of five market based divisions. 'Bulkflow'handles bulk 
commodities such as steel, coal, fertiliser and limestone; 'forestry' transports logs, 
pulp, paper and timber products; 'cargo flow' dealing with bulk primary products and 
export and import container traffic; 'distribution services' are responsible for freight 
forwarders and the transport of new and used vehicles; 'freight forwarding' functions 
as an internal freight forwarder, consolidating wagon loads of general freight. 
Through joint ventures and agreements with trucking firms, Railfreight is able to 
offer a full nationwide network and achieve door-to-door coverage. 
Passenger 
This is complementary to the Railfreight business, using the marginal network 
capacity to generate additional revenue for the company. Passenger Group serves the 
following markets, commuter, long distance rail passengers, interisland passengers 
and cars, and cross-strait commercial vehicle traffic. Commuter services aperate 
under contracts to respective Regional councils, whilst Intercity services operate over 
seven routes with no public funding. 
Operations 
This provides line haul services to Railfreight and Passenger Group. It manages most 
of the infrastructure and mobile assets of the company, for example rolling stock, 
ferries, track and signalling. Four divisions have been set up, each with its own 
responsibilities, 
- Network Operations, that has responsibility for the operation and maintenance 
of the company's fxed and mobile assets. 
- Network Services, responsible for controlling train movements. 
- Engineering, that designs and builds land-based assets. 
- Interisland Line, that operates three roll-on, roll-off ferries across Cook strait. 
Track Access 
NZRL see it as vital that they have control of their infrastructure, track standards 
and so costs. NZRL has thus remained a vertically integrated business. Control of 
access to the track is defied by the terms of the lease with New Zealand Rail 
Corporation for use of the land under the track. Under these terms, other operators 
have rights to use the track on any section for which tonnage or passenger levels fall 
below a specified threshold. 
Any operators granted access are restrained from causing 'unreasonable interference' 
to NZRL's operations and have to pay for the use of track etc ... on a normal 
commercial basis, including a reasonable rate of return. In effect track access is 
minimalised and definitely not encouraged. In part, this is a reflection of the 
government's belief that real and effective competition already exists between road 
and rail, and ships and rail. 
3.6.4 Results ..,.. 
~ .:t:~. ~ 
.?. 
. .. 
Between 1982 and 1989, New Zealand Railways lost about 25% of its freight tonnage, 
however, only 40% of this decline was due to road substitution with 60% ofithe fall 
due to the recessionary climate. The current freight market share of inter-regional 
traffic is estimated to be 30%. 
A look at performance indicators demonstrates that NZRL has improved its productive 
efficiency quite substantially from 1982. Staff productivity has increased by 200%, 
average train size has increased by 21% and the wagon fleet has fallen by 69%. The 
emphasis has been on greater utilisation of rolling stock coupled with increases in 
staff productivity. 
During the same period real rail freight rates have fallen by 50% which indicates that 
the savings generated through this period have been passed on to consumers, 
improvements in allocative efficiency as well as in productive efficiency have therefore 
taken place. 
3.6.5 S u m m a r y  % 7 
The results enjoyed by NZRL have been accomplished over a 10 year period. The first 
eight years were spent 'commercialising' and 'downsizing' the rail operations. The 
government was committed to freeing not only the transport market but also the 
economy as a whole. It placed particular emphasis on freeing the railway's labour 
market, removing the Railways from the State's centralised wage fxing system, 
limiting the right to strike and giving a stronger legal emphasis to labour relations. 
This was accompanied by managements' pressure to change working practices e.g. two 
man trains. Similarly the British government has identified changes in both the 
labour market and in working practices as a key area for improving productivity in 
the rail industry (see Foster, 1994). 
Commercialisation was further helped with the introduction of a market-orientated 
structure e.g. Freight, Passenger, Property etc .... This meant that very clear business 
objectives could be set and accountability improved. As Small (1993) says, 
"The combination of accountability, individual responsibility and inter-group 
competition contributed to a new management ethos within the rail system." 
Once again this is similar to events in the UK. Here BR was introducing sedorisation 
in an attempt to improve accountability for each of its business sectors and to improve 
information flows on costs, revenues and subsidy payments. BR enjoyed considerable 
productivity gains but unlike NZRC was unable to achieve an operating profit. 
It is a t  this point that BR and New Zealand railways diverge. The rail operations side 
of NZRC was hived off to form a limited liability entity, NZRL, which has now been 
privatised. The main difference between the privatisation of BR and that of XZRL 
is that NZRL has been privatised as a vertically integrated business. NZRL feel that 
an infrastructure company, at  least one step removed from the market, would be 
unable to judge and respond to market requirements thus leading to investment in 
areas which are not commercial priorities. Furthermore, the New Zealand 
government feels that there is sufficient competition between rail, road and air to 
encourage efficiency within the railway industry. The objective it set the NZRC in the 
eighties is proof of its belief in this. 
3.7 SWEDISH RAILWAYS 
3.7.1 Introduction 
The state railways original1 function was to connect private rail systems that served 
local regions, resulting in a national and regional network. Gradually. the state took 
over networks as they ran in to  deficit. With road development and 
motorisation this trend increased until by 1965 privately-owned lines accounted for 
less than 5% of route kms and by 1991 for none. 
Until 1979 the national network operated without subsidy, and the whole rail system 
was one of the most efficient and cost effective in Western Europe (BRB and The 
University of Leeds, 1979). However, in the eighties a combination of falling market 
share and unclear management objectives led to spiralling deficit payments and 
falling investment. Public and political concern about the lack of investment and 
growing levels of congestion within cities led to the 1988 Transportation Act. 
3.7.2 The Transportation Act 1988 
The act was based upon a 'road model', the main features of which are summarised i 
in appendix three of Preston et a1 (1994). 
(i) The rail network was divided into a trunk system of main arteries and county 
lines. 
(ii) Rail infrastructure became the responsibility of a new state agency Banverket 
(BV), who leased track access to train operators on a marginal social cost basis. 
BV has responsibility for new investment, maintenance and acts as  regulator 
over safety and scheduling matters. 
(iii) Statens Jarnvagar (SJ) became a train operator and marketing organisation, 
for both passenger and freight operations. It retained ownership of terminals 
and rolling stock, also maintaining operating rights over trunk routes for 
passenger traffic, and trunk and county routes for freight traffic (excluding iron 
ore). 
(iv) The 24 county public transport authorities (CTA's) would set the level of 
passenger service to be operated on county lines and could choose contractors 
other than SJ  to operate local and regional services. 
(v) If SJ or the CTA's did not wish to exploit their transportation rights (not run 
a service) then the government (trunk lines) and BV (other lines) can award 
such rights to other operators. 
(vi) Infrastructure charges paid by train operators would be consistent with the 
pricing regime employed by the road authority, namely marginal soc+al:cost. 
." . 
(vii) The state would provide grants for new investment. . .  . ~ . ~ 
BVs organisation is highly decentralised, being split into five regions and 21 districts. 
There is also an Industrial Division that deals with purchasing, production and 
storage of material, and an Independent Railway Inspectorate responsible for safety 
checks and accident investigations. SJ's organisation has moved from a regional to 
a product based set up, with the creation of four main divisions: passenger, freight, 
mechanical and real-estate. 
Although BV and SJ are two separate organisations the distinction set out in the 
Transportation A d  1988 is sometimes blurred. Timetabling is currently carried out 
by SJ, traffic control is operated by SJ using BVs infrastructure whilst 
telecommunications are used jointly by both operators. The first two points put at 
risk the potential for introducing serious competition for the provision of   we dish rail 
services. The latter has been resolved technicallv with assienment of exchanee 
installations and interconnecting cables to BV, whilst cables andfacilities to portabie 
equipment for dired use were taken by the user (either BV or SJ). .* -a 
3.7.3 Financial Arrangements 
As outlined earlier all train operators pay an access charge equal to  the marginal 
social cost. The charge is in two parts (i) a f ~ e d  element, expressed as a rate per rail 
vehicle axle (ii) a variable element, related to vehicle t o ~ e - k m ,  differentiated by type 
of vehicle to reflect different amounts of wear and tear on the track structures. The 
charge is a marginal social cost charge, so the element also includes socio-economic 
costs e.g. diesel exhaust pollution. 
Both SJ and BV still receive quite substantial subsidies from the government. In SJ's 
case these are for the operation of 'socially necessary' passenger and freight services, 
a situation similar to the proposed 'franchise subsidies' in the UK. SJ  is still expected 
to make a profit after subsidy, and in 1990 achieved profits of SEK681 m of which rail 
accounted for SEK372 m. The subsidy payment for that year amounted to 
SEK1,348 m. 
In 1990 SJ  made a track access payment of SEK 665m to BV. To cover the 
differences in BVs incoming and outgoings, the government funds BV through an 
annual appropriation. This has steadily increased from 1988 onwards, partly because 
of increases in investment (see Table 3.8). 
Table 3.5: Government Support To Bankervet 
Year SEKm 
1988 3275 
1989 4035 
1990 4300 
1991 5250 
1992 6500 
Source: Preston et a1 (1994) 
The government also pays subsidy to CTA's where they have taken over operating 
rights from SJ. 
3.7.4 Franchising 
Although franchising is confined to county routes, the results make interesting 
reading in terms of their implication for franchising in the UK. According to Ridley 
and Teny (1992): 
"Since the reforms under the 1988 Ad, most CTA's have taken an active 
interest in the development of cost-effective rail services and have called 
tenders for the provision of railway services in accordance with a specification 
tailored to their view of 1ocaVregional needs." 
So far two principal challenges have arisen to SJ's monopoly of provision, BK-Tag and 
Linjetag. Both already operate bus services under contract for CTAs in south and 
central Sweden and provide maintenance services for other bus companies. Although 
both firms bid for contracts, only BK-Tag was successful in winning contracts in (1) 
Smaland and Halland (1990) and (2) Borlange (1992). 
SJ has responded to the competition by cutting its tender prices by an average of 30%. 
It  has since secured all contracts for CTA operations, and recently displaced BK-tag 
in its two franchise contracts. However, the initial success of BK-Tag is proof that 
competition can exist via a franchise despite the existence of barriers to entry such 
as, economies of experience and access to existing maintenance services. 
BK-Tag combated these barriers through changing inflexible working practices, 
reducing maintenance costs and integrating their present road operations and 
maintenance facilities with those of rail. These policies resulted in BK-Tag's train 
crew of 43 operating the same services that previously used 250 employees of SJ; BK- 
Tag achieving higher vehicle utilisation than SJ did and an estimated labour 
productivity gain of 10% via a renegotiated pay structure. BK-Tag's vehicle utilisation 
was 130,000 km p.a. per car compared to SJ's 90,000 k m  p.a. per car. Such results 
are indicative of the potential productivity and operating gains that could occur in a 
privatised BR. 
These results have encouraged the Swedish government to the extent that they are 
proposing to extend the franchise system to regional and longer distance services 
which at  the moment are the sole preserve of SJ. Whether the CTA results can be 
replicated is a question that has to be asked. For the CTA operations, the bulk of the 
rolling stock was provided by CTA, thus helping to reduce the barriers of entry for 
BK-Tag. CTA operations are also small and less complex in nature, which allowed 
savings in training costs and overnight allowances. As yet no such proposals have 
been put forward for the provision of rolling stock on other routes and a further worry 
must be the strategic role that SJ  has in timetabling. 
3.7.5 Summary 
The Swedish Transportation Act 1988 is in some ways similar to the proposals 
contained in the Railways Act 1993. The separation of infrastructure from operations, 
realistic charges for track access, the payment of subsidy for the operation of 'socially 
necessary' services and the use of a franchise system to reduce costs, improve 
productivity and services. However, overall the Swedish restructuring does not go 'as 
far' as that proposed by the Railways Act in terms of creating a competitive 
environment. The Act ensures that all of BR's services, both mainline and local, will 
be franchised and eventually opened up to further competition through 'open access'. 
Rolling Stock companies (ROSCOs) will reduce the barriers to entry formed by rolling 
stock, whilst the timetable function of Railtrack and the presence of an  independent 
regulator ensures strategic barriers to entry are minimalised. 
Although the Swedish government envisages franchising the whole rail netwprk and 
has already scheduled 'open access' for the 1st January 1995, both these goals are still 
very long term. At this point the emphasis that Sweden places upon a national 
transport strategy should be noted. Transport is given a major role in the 
management of the national economy and the relationship between road and rail 
policy is continuously assessed for consistency of treatment. Great emphasis is 
therefore placed upon assessing both road and rail by the same socio-economic 
criteria, so creating a 'level playing field' for both subsidy and investment, and making 
the real cost of using both modes transparent to users. 
3.8.1 Background 
From 1970 onwards railroads in the USA have been undergoing a process of 
reorganisation and reform. The impetus for change was brought about by a financial 
crisis facing railroads in the north east of the USA. Between 1947 and 1970, freight train 
miles had dropped by 31%, from 616 billion to 427 billion. During the same period Inter- 
city passenger miles fell 84%, from 39.9 billion to 4.6 billion. This fall in traffic was the 
result oE 
(1) Tight regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), that required all 
tariffs to be published and be made available to all shippers under the same terms 
and conditio~~s. Closure proceedures under the ICC were alao elaborate and time 
consuming, extending unecessarily the lives of unprofitable lines. 
(2) The federal programme of highway construction. 
In response to the situation facing passenger railways, Congress passed the Rail 
Passenger Service Act 1970, which created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
that trades under the name Amtrak. The government also proceeded to deregulate freight 
in 1980 with the passing of the Staggers Act (see Grimm and Gordon, 1991). 
3.8.2 Amtrak 
Amtrak is a passenger train operating company that owns locomotives, rolling stock, and 
a majority of station and terminal facilities. It now owns 450 miles of track in the north- 
east corridor (Washington-Philadelphia-New York-Boston), but makes track access 
payments to about 20 freight railroads for the use of another 24,000 miles of route. 
Amtrak has operated as a commercial business since its formation, with the backing of 
federal subsidies. Its performance has been impressive, according to Ridley and Terry 
(1992), ,* 
"... in 1991, it recovered 79% of its costs from revenues of $1.4 billion (up from 65% 
in 1987). The Corporation employs 25,000 people, operated 6.3 billion passenger 
miles in 1991 and achieved an average 77% on-time arrival." 
The track access charges paid by Amtrak are based upon an 'avoidable costs' formula 
based mainly upon gross tonnage and speed. To cut down on contract costs this formula 
has been converted to a flat rnilage rate, updated for inflation. The charging system is 
clear and relatively simple, something the Railtrack charges are not. 
New investments are paid for by the party who benefits from them. If both parties benefit 
then costs are shared. The access contracts between Amtrak and the freight companies 
cover other eventualities. The freight railroads are required to maintain tracks and 
structures to the same standard as existed when Amtrak commenced service. The freight 
railroads are obliged to provide emergency assistance in the form of rolling stock and 
maintenance, if Amtrak's operations face severe disruption. They also have to compensate 
Amtrak for delays to their schedule caused by track maintenance or poor quality track. 
In addition to Amtrak, there are 12 commuter railroads in operation serving major 
conurbations. They are typically under 300 miles and only recover 40% to 60% of costs 
from revenues. Such services are run as franchises and as such give useful insights into 
the problems of rail franchise agreements. A series of case studies by Nera (1992) 
examined two USA commuter franchises, the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority 
(MBTA) and the Southern California Regional Railway Authority (SCRAA). The results 
of these case studies are presented in section 4.3 of this working paper. 
3.8.3 Results 
The original aim of Amtrak was to provide a skeleton Inter-city service on a reduced 
subsidy level. By 1991 Inter-city passenger miles had increased by 37% from 4.6 billion 
in 1970 to 6.3 billion, whilst its cost recovery ratio increased to 79%. The goalposts have 
now shifted and its objective is now to operate without any federal support, a goal it only 
sees as possible through the extension and expansion of services; hence the corporations' 
current 15 year capital investment plan totalling $17.6 billion. 
These results are interesting but from a UK perspective of more interest is the 
relationship between Arntrack and the freight operators, a relationship that can be 
likened to that between the TOC's and Railtrack. 
Unlike Railtrack's proposals for track access charging, the charges levied by the freight 
operators are based more on negotiation than the product of detailed cost stuclies. 
Whether this will be the long term outcome for the UK is open to speculation. 
T, 
Initially, Amtrak and the freight operators attempted to tie one another down to specific 
obligations, charges etc.... Experience has shown that this can result in costly conflicts 
and in recent years the attitude has shifted to one of co-operation in the realisation of the 
economic and financial benefits that result e.g. planning maintenance and investment. 
The extent of such an initial conflict in the UK is difficult to judge. Part of the ~robiem 4 
- - 
in the USA was that freight operators' saw conflict in the allocation of train paths and the 
quality of infrastructure required by both operators. The impartiality of Railtrack and the 
&gulator should help to avoid any such conflict, although it is-quite probable that 
disagreements about t,ypes of investment and service quality will arise early on in the 
relationship. 
Amtrak's policy of co-operation can be illustrated by its Incentive Payment scheme it 
operates with the freight railways. These payments are designed to encourage competent 
'running time' and are paid on a train-mile basis. Amtrak sees such payments as 
beneficial because they reduce train crew costs, improve utilisation of rolling stock, reduce 
fuel consumption and give greater satisfaction to customers. Payments are on a scale 
and penalties (negative payments) are awarded for late running. Railtrack has initiated 
a similar scheme, whereby Performance Payments reflecting Railtrack's contribution to 
the levels of reliability and punctuality achieved, will be paid by OPRAF. 
3.8.4 Summary 
Amtrak has succeeded in fulfilling the objectives it set itself in the 1970's but is still a 
long way from its long term aim of profitability, despite paying for its track access at 
avoidable cost only. The greatest success has been that enjoyed by the freight companies 
who, through deregulation, increased their profitability which in turn has allowed them 
to contribute to investment in track and signalling. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The first part of this paper described the proposals for rail privatisation in Great 
Britain. In the second part these proposals were contrasted with the experience and 
proposals in other countries around the world. Privatisation has already taken place 
in Japan, New Zealand and Argentina, and in the latter cases involved (very long) 
franchises. In all cases however privatisation was on the basis of vertical integration 
of infrastructure and train services, with little or no scope for 'on the track' 
competition. 
By contrast, European proposals centre on the separation of infrastructure from 
operations, although only Sweden had actually carried this out before Britain. In 
Sweden there is some experience of franchising, with the mixed results that although 
there has been little competition, cost reductions do seem to have been acheived. As 
yet there is no 'open access' operation on any significant scale in Sweden. In this 
aspect the British government's proposals are truely innovatory. Therefore, there is 
little experience from which to judge its effects anywhere in the world. 
In conclusion, it is not possible to reach any firm predictions of the results of the 
British rail privatisation on the basis of practice elsewhere. What is clear is that in 
designing a very complex and innovative form of privatisation to maxirnise the 
potential for competition, the British government has introduced many features which 
may create serious problems. Whether these are so serious as  to outweigh the 
benefits of increased competion will only be known after many years of experience. 
APPENDIX ONE 
' This is a joint figure for both MML and Cross Country 
Joint figures with Chiltern 
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